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The intentional stance is a term coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett for the level of abstraction in which we view the behavior of a thing in terms of mental properties. It is part of a theory of mental content proposed by Dennett, which provides the underpinnings of his later works on free will, consciousness, folk psychology, and evolution. == Dennett and "intentionality" == Dennett (1971, p. 87) states that he took the concept of “intentionality” from the work of the German philosopher Franz Brentano.〔In his second edition (1973/1924, pp.180-181), Brentano added this explanation of “intentional” to his 1911 edition: "This expression had been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term 'intentional' the Scholastics very frequently used the expression 'objective'. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression 'intentional' because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as 'objectively existing', for modern day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to 'mere subjective appearances'."〕 When clarifying the distinction between mental phenomena (viz., mental activity) and physical phenomena, Brentano (p. 97) argued that, in contrast with physical phenomena,〔In addition to cogitations (such as judgement, recollection and inference) and emotions (such as joy and sorrow and fear), Brentano (op.cit.p.79) includes things such as “hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warm or cold” in his category of physical phenomena.〕 the “distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena”〔By contrast, Brentano (p.80) includes things such as “a color… a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense” in his category of mental phenomena.〕 was “the reference to something as an object” — a characteristic he called “''intentional inexistence''”.〔Note that, whilst the term “inexistence” appears haphazardly right throughout the text of Bretano's work as both ''in-existence'' and inexistence'', it very clearly always carries the “inherence” meaning (i.e., the fact or condition of existing in something), rather than the “non-existence” meaning (i.e., the fact or condition of not existing).〕 Dennett constantly speaks of the “''aboutness''” of ''intentionality''; for example: “the aboutness of the pencil marks composing a shopping list is derived from the intentions of the person whose list it is” (Dennett, 1995, p. 240). John Searle (1999, pp. 85) stresses that “competence” in predicting/explaining human behaviour involves being able to both recognize others as “''intentional''” beings, and interpret others' minds as having “intentional states” (e.g., beliefs and desires): :"The primary evolutionary role of the mind is to relate us in certain ways to the environment, and especially to other people. My subjective states relate me to the rest of the world, and the general name of that relationship is "intentionality." These subjective states include beliefs and desires, intentions and perceptions, as well as loves and hates, fears and hopes. "Intentionality," to repeat, is the general term for all the various forms by which the mind can be directed at, or be about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world." (p.85)〔Searle (1999, pp.85-86) clarifies his usage: "''Intentionality'' is an unfortunate word, and like a lot of unfortunate words in philosophy, we owe it to the German-speaking philosophers. The word suggests that intentionality, in the sense of directedness, must always have some connection with 'intending' in the sense in which, for example, I intend to go to the movies tonight. (German has no problem with this because ''Intentionalität does not sound like ''Absicht, the word for intention in the ordinary sense of intending to go to the movies.) So we have to keep in mind that in English intending is just one form of intentionality among many. Foss and Bow (1986, p.94) present a far more A.I.-oriented view: "We assume that people understand the actions of others by viewing those actions as purposive, as goal directed. People use their knowledge of human intentionality, of the types of goals people have and of the types of plans they devise in service of those goals, to understand action sequences that are described in narratives or observed directly. Many recent approaches to comprehension emphasize the role of goal planning knowledge when understanding narratives and conversations, and when remembering observed sequences and goal directed actions. According to these approaches, understanding involves inferring the intentions (i.e. the plans and goals) of the characters, speakers, or actors. Such inferences are ubiquitous because narratives frequently provide only sketchy descriptions of the character's actions and goals; speakers rarely state their intentions directly; and observers rarely see all the events preceding or following the action to be explained. Therefore, people are forced to use their general knowledge of human intentionality to fill in the missing information; they do this by generating expectations and drawing inferences in order to come up with a plan that explains an actor's behavior. Although the importance of this type of knowledge for understanding natural discourse and action sequences has been recognized, only recently have cognitive scientists begun examining the psychological processes involved in drawing inferences about human intentionality…"〕 According to Dennett (1987, p. 48-49), folk psychology provides a systematic, “reason-giving explanation” for a particular action, and an account of the historical origins of that action, based on deeply embedded assumptions about the agent;〔Because we use folk psychology effortlessly all the time to ''systematically predict'' actions, and because this way of thinking about things seems to be so very effective — Fodor (1987, p.3) speaks of its “extraordinary predictive power” — Dennett is certain that the practice of treating others as rational agents must have evolved and developed over time: "we treat each other as if we were rational agents, and this myth — for surely we are not all that rational — works very well because we are pretty rational" (p.50). Siegert (2001, p.183), agrees: "Evolutionary psychology argues that the ability to form a representation of what another human is thinking is an ability that has been acquired and developed through natural selection. The ability to interpret other people's facial expressions, their body language, and their tone of voice, has obvious advantages for survival. In earlier environments, our ancestors had to be able determine who was a friend and who was an enemy, who was a potential mate and who was not. The ability to distinguish between facial expressions associated with suspicion and curiosity, fear and anger, or disgust and sadness, may have been the difference between life and death. In modern society we also rely on this ability for surviving socially, if not literally. Our ability to accurately express our emotions, to know how and when to express them, to know when to conceal our emotions, and to be able read and interpret the emotions of other people are skills that impact hugely on our ability to form lasting relationships, breed and raise healthy children, and gain high status in our careers" (p.183).〕 namely that: :(a) the agent’s action was entirely rational;〔Dennett stresses how research into artificial intelligence has shown just how rational humans actually are: “Even the most sophisticated AI programs stumble blindly into misinterpretations and misunderstandings that even small children reliably evade without a second thought” (1987, p.52).〕 :(b) the agent’s action was entirely reasonable (in the prevailing circumstances); :(c) the agent held certain ''beliefs'';〔Note that it is irrelevant whether the agent actually holds these particular beliefs or not; the critical feature is that the observer ascribes them to the agent. The intentional stance involves an observer amassing a constellation of subjective, observer-centred assumptions, unique to that specific observer, that are expressed in the form of a set of supposed beliefs and desires which are attributed to (and projected upon) the object of that observation ''in order to explain something to the observer''. The observer is not trying to objectively determine the agent’s actual state of mind. His only need is to be able to represent the agent’s behaviour to himself in such a way that he can respond to the agent’s behaviour. Consequently, these attributions rarely describe any actual belief or desire an agent might maintain at any time; and the objective truth of the observer’s subjective assumptions about the agent’s “inner life” is entirely irrelevant — always provided, of course, that his response to the agent’s behaviour has been appropriate.〕 :(d) the agent ''desired'' certain things; and :(e) the agent’s future action could be systematically predicted from the ''beliefs'' and ''desires'' so ascribed. This approach is also consistent with the earlier work of Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel, whose joint study revealed that, when subjects were presented with an animated display of 2-dimensional shapes, they were inclined to ascribe intentions to the shapes.〔See Heider & Simmel (1944); the animation used in the experiment is at "youtube.com/watch?v=n9TWwG4SFWQ".〕 Further, Dennett (1987, p. 52) argues that, based on our fixed personal views of what all humans ought to believe, desire and do, we predict (or explain) the beliefs, desires and actions of others “by calculating in a normative system”;〔In other words, humans have a propensity to systematically think as follows: X has performed action A because they believe B, and desires D, and (on the basis of their desire for D, and their belief that B is how things obtain in the real world) X has chosen to A, with the intention of achieving goal G (which, as they understand things, will produce outcome D). This deep desire to eschew disorder and make things systematic has a parallel in the way that humans assess the concept of “randomness”. In many circumstances, according to Falk and Konold (1997; 1998), an individual’s concept of what is “random” is, in fact, far from it — and this “''subjective randomness''” is, often, far more disordered than a truly random sequence. Lisanby and Lockhead (1991), also differentiate between subjective randomness and genuine randomness (upon which they which they bestow the tautologous title of “''stochastic randomness''”). :"That subjective randomness results from people's failure to make sense of their observations is not a new idea. Piaget and Inhelder (1951/1975 ) attribute the origin of the idea of chance in children to their realizing the impossibility of predicting oncoming events or finding causal explanations. The experience of randomness is thus construed as an admission of failure of our intellectual operations" (Falk and Konold, 1988, p.658).〕 and, driven by the reasonable assumption that all humans are rational beings — who do ''have'' specific beliefs and desires and do ''act'' on the basis of those beliefs and desires in order to get what they want — these predictions/explanations are based on four simple rules: # The agent’s ''beliefs'' are those a rational individual ought to have (i.e., given their “perceptual capacities”, “epistemic needs” and “biography”);〔Swinburne (2001, p.39-40) argues that one of the most important features of beliefs is that they are involuntary: "Belief is a passive state; believing is a state in which you are, it is not a matter of you doing something. And it is an involuntary state, a state in which you find yourself and which you cannot change at will at an instant. I believe that today is Tuesday, that I am now in Oxford, that Aquinas died in AD 1274, and so on and so on. I cannot sudden-ly decide to believe that today is Monday, that I am now in Italy, or that Aquinas lived in the eighteenth century. That belief is involuntary was a claim of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. "Belief consists", wrote Hume, "merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters."〕 # In general, these beliefs “are both true and relevant to () life;〔In addressing cases where an agent’s beliefs are not “both true and relevant to () life”, Dennett (1987, p.49) notes that “when false beliefs are attributed, special stories must be told to explain how the error resulted from the presence of features in the environment that are deceptive relative to the perceptual capacities of the system.”〕 # The agent’s ''desires'' are those a rational individual ought to have (i.e., given their “biological needs”, and “the most practicable means of satisfying them”) in order to further their “survival” and “procreation” needs;〔Dennett also addresses the cases in which the desires are “abnormal” and remarks that “() ‘abnormal’ desires are attributable if special stories can be told” (1987, p.49).〕 and # The agent’s behaviour will be composed of those acts a rational individual holding those ''beliefs'' (and having those ''desires'') ought to perform. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Intentional stance」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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